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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the 93rd Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board in 2014, there was 
a workshop dedicated to the activity-travel behavioral impacts and travel demand modeling 
implications of driverless cars. In this context, one of the presenters deemed shared 
autonomous vehicles as the “new transit system”. While this assertion was not shared by 
all participants, it immediately brought to one of the author’s mind the famous claim by 
Robert Moses in 1948: “Today we are well underway to a solution of the traffic problem” 
when claiming that building more highways, bridges and lanes instead of providing public 
transport was the key to solve the major transportation issues affecting urban areas. 
Autonomous vehicles (AV) do indeed offer several opportunities that can and should be – 
wisely implemented – incorporated into future transport systems. Nevertheless, all these 
opportunities also carry some risks that have the potential to attenuate or eliminate the 
benefits associated with this technology. Hence, it should not be surprising that this paper 
starts similar to Smith (2012), who was one of the first warning voices remarking that the 
hopes set on autonomous vehicles, sensors and computers to solve traffic problems 
resemble notoriously the hopes set on car use and infrastructure in the 1960s (also see 
Meyer et al., 2017). Against this background, the objective of this paper is to present a 
literature-based systemic analysis of different opportunities and challenges that are 
associated with autonomous vehicles taking over the road, highlighting different strategies 
that can be implemented by responsible authorities in order to steer the development of 
transport systems towards sustainability. While previous works have aimed at providing an 
overarching structure for the causal chains and resulting effects that autonomous driving 
might have on travel on the base of System Dynamics (Kuhnimhof 2015, Gruel and 
Stanford, 2016), the paper at hand presents an economic conceptual exploration of the 
first- and second-order effects1 of autonomous vehicles based on well-established concepts 
of the transportation economics literature. 
First and foremost, it is important to clarify that this paper deals with fully automated 
vehicles, i.e. automobiles that are capable to perform all driving tasks and no driver is 
required during the entire journey (level 5 of automation according to SAE, 2014). 
Furthermore, the focus is set on passenger transport and any possible implication 
associated with automated freight transport is not taken into account. This work deals 
mostly with motorized transport (although without losing sight of non-motorized passenger 
transportation), subdividing it into private and public transport. Private transport includes 
traveling with privately owned automated vehicles (referred to as automated cars) as well 
as with autonomous car sharing systems (referred to as ACS or automated taxis). The 
latter, together with autonomous ride sharing (ARS), are defined as shared autonomous 
vehicles (SAV); in contrast to ACS, ARS defines a system where several parties are 
allowed inside the autonomous vehicle at the same time. Such system is considered to be 
an integral part of future public transport (PT) systems. Overall, fully automated vehicles 
are in this paper assumed to operate in all forms of motorized transport, i.e. as private 
vehicles, in sharing systems, and in PT systems. Finally, we limit our analysis to the 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of this paper, changes in the transportation systems associated with the introduction of 
AVs are categorized in first- and second-order effects. The former relates to changes that can be directly 
ascribed to the introduction of the technology (e.g. improvements in driving efficiency), while the latter stand 
for developments that are due to changes in transport demand (these effects are also known as rebound 
effects). 
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transportation system, leaving considerations associated with the labor market aside (e.g. 
eventual job losses associated with the automatization of vehicles are not being considered 
or likewise it is assumed that, in the long term they do not have major effects due to 
reconversion of the labor force). 
Finally, the paper concentrates on short and medium term effects of autonomous vehicles. 
This essentially means that changes in land use structure and changes in supply channels 
for resources and human capital are not considered, as these developments will depend on 
how authorities tackle the aforementioned short and medium term effects of autonomous 
vehicles.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the first-order 
effects of autonomous vehicles discussed in the literature. Section 3 offers a structured 
overview and discussion of the main possible systemic effects of autonomous vehicles. 
Section 4 presents different policy aspects and discusses strategies in order to enable 
decision makers to shape transportation systems for the introduction of autonomous 
vehicles in the future. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the paper. 
2. FIRST-ORDER EFFECTS 
Over the past few years, first-order effects (understood as direct technology effects on the 
transportation systems and not considering travel behavioral adaptations) of autonomous 
vehicles on transportation systems have been extensively discussed in the literature. 
Several studies offer a detailed description of the potential benefits associated with the 
introduction of this new technology (e.g. Thomopoulos and Givoni, 2014; Fagnant and 
Kockelman, 2015; e-mobil BW GmbH, 2015, among many others). 
For example, it is expected that autonomous vehicles will lead to a reduction in the 
generalized costs (understood as the monetarized sum of all costs experienced by the users, 
such as fare, travel time, waiting time, etc.)  of taxi systems and private cars. For both these 
forms of private transport, the reduction is on the one hand related to cost-efficient driving, 
i.e. the fuel efficiency gains that (connected) driverless vehicles will offer. Without the 
necessity of a qualified driver on board on the other hand (Litman, 2014; Lenz and 
Fraedrich, 2015), taxi systems will become ACS systems, and user prices might drop with 
operational costs (Bösch et al., 2017a). The latter effect is not as relevant for autonomous 
private cars; still, they would be able to drive to their parking position without human 
interaction, so passengers can enter/exit the vehicle directly at the origin/destination of 
their trips (Fraedrich et al., 2015). Presumably, this yields a significant reduction in the 
generalized costs of parking, in terms of both parking fees and searching time (Litman, 
2014; Correia and v. Arem, 2016), as after dropping the passenger AVs may undertake the 
search for a cheaper/free parking place on its own (eventually driving back home or even 
remaining on the traffic for short stays) . Both possible developments (cost-efficient 
driving and reduced generalized parking costs) would in consequence imply a reduction of 
the generalized costs of travel for private vehicles. 
Opportunities for public transport systems related to the introduction of (connected) 
driverless vehicles are also multifold. In addition to the cost reduction associated with the 
reduction of personnel costs, with cost-efficient driving or with intelligent prioritization 
techniques, it is conceivable that PT services are operated in a more flexible and 
3 
 
personalized way. Hence, it may be possible to reduce the vehicle size, and to increase the 
frequency and the density of the network. This would allow combining mass transportation 
modes (trains, buses) with fixed route plans in high-demand areas with flexible smaller 
vehicles for last mile trips (Lenz and Fraedrich, 2015; Yap et al., 2016), overall increasing 
the attractiveness of public transportation by reducing the generalized costs. Finally, ARS 
systems, where trips of passengers are pooled and user-costs are split between the different 
parties might come into place. 
Furthermore, many studies associate autonomous vehicles with improvements in traffic 
flow and increases in road capacity, which are likely to affect both, private and public 
transport (Tampere et al., 2009; Shladover et al., 2012; Litman, 2014; Friedrich, 2015, 
among others).2 These improvements are related to the implementation of adaptive cruise 
control (ACC; Kesting et al., 2007) or cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC; Piao 
and McDonald, 2008; Schakel and v. Arem, 2010) as well as intersection control systems 
(e.g. Reservation Based Intersection Control, RBIC; Dresner and Stone, 2005; Le Vine et 
al., 2016). In this context, some authors argue that significant improvements can only be 
expected once a certain critical amount of autonomous vehicles has been reached 
(Shladover et al., 2012; Bierstedt, 2014). Kestin et al. (2005), in contrast, claim that even 
small proportions of autonomous vehicles would lead to a significant increase in the 
maximum flow on the roads. Many authors then argue, that this greater capacity will, in 
consequence, result in less traffic congestion and shorter travel times (Litman, 2014; 
Pinjari et al., 2013; Heinrichs and Cyganski; 2015). Similarly, Fagnant and Kockelman 
(2015) postulate that high shares of autonomous vehicles would lead to an increase in the 
reliability of travel time. In any case, as a first-order effect, travel time and reliability gains 
are to be expected, which in turn, implies a reduction of the generalized costs of travel. 
Apart from benefits in the transport system, autonomous vehicles are often associated with 
a reduction in negative environmental externalities3, namely global and local exhaust 
emissions and traffic safety: 
1. Energy-efficient driving through automation has, amongst others, been discussed 
by Bullis (2011), Fagnant and Kockelman (2015), and Gruel and Stanford (2016). 
These improvements are expected to be achieved by a homogenization of traffic 
flows (e.g. platooning), which essentially tries to avoid unnecessary acceleration 
and deceleration (Klaußner and Irtenkauf, 2013; e-mobil BW GmbH, 2015). This 
could lead to a reduction of specific (i.e. per vehicle kilometer traveled – VKT) fuel 
consumption and therefore emissions. Apart from reducing the environmental 
externality, this effect also leads to a direct benefit through cost-efficient driving as 
discussed above. 
2. Improved road safety by eventually eliminating human risk factors has, amongst 
others, been discussed by Fagnant and Kockelman (2015) and e-mobil BW GmbH 
(2015). According to Statistisches Bundesamt (2015), roughly 90% of traffic 
                                                          
2 Actually, improvements in traffic flow do not yield an increase in physical road capacity, but rather a 
decrease in the capacity utilization. For simplification, and since both effects lead to an efficiency increase, 
we use the term `capacity increase´. 
3 Because of the limited impacts of autonomous vehicles on noise levels and damages, we do not discuss this 
externality further. However, benefits of AVs in this context are conceivable if the vehicles are bundled 
together and therefore overall emit less noise emissions than when driving alone one after the other. To the 
knowledge of the authors, there is as of now no contribution in the literature that investigated this potential. 
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accidents in Germany are caused by human errors. These values are in line with the 
results reported by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2008) for 
the US. Fagnant and Kockelman (2015) expect that road accidents will be reduced 
by 50% already at a market penetration rate of autonomous vehicles of only 10%. 
With a market penetration rate of 90%, they estimate a decrease of traffic accidents 
by 90%. Other studies indicate that, as long as vehicles are not fully automated, 
accident risk might increase since drivers adjust their behavior and, in consequence, 
fail to adequately and quickly react to emergency situations (see Mahr and Müller, 
2011, for an example with ACC systems). Moreover it is likely that the lack of 
human interaction (e.g. intangible codes, eye contacts, among others) also creates 
risk situations. In the long run, however, it is likely that specific accident risk will 
be reduced by the introduction of autonomous vehicles. 
Other benefits associated with autonomous vehicles are related to the mobilization new 
user groups such as elderly, mobility impaired people or children, as well as to the 
independent car use of travelers without a valid driver’s license. A (higher) participation of 
these user groups in economic and social life might yield positive externalities as the 3-9% 
increase in VKT suggests which has recently been estimated for Germany and the US by 
Kröger et al. (2016); in the Netherlands, an increase of 4%-26% in VKT could be expected 
in association with autonomous vehicles (Milakis et al., 2016). Moreover, it would also be 
possible to undertake certain trips by private car that are currently being undertaken by 
alternative transport modes due to other restrictions, such as trips to and from activities 
where alcohol is consumed or overnight trips. 
Finally, several studies have addressed potential changes in the valuation of time spent in 
the vehicle as autonomous vehicles will offer many possibilities to reduce the disutility of 
travel time, by relieving the user of the driving tasks and allowing to dedicate the time in 
the vehicles to activities, deemed as more meaningful by the driver (Silberg et al., 2012; 
Heinrichs, 2015; Zmund et al., 2016). For instance, a study conducted by Willumsen and 
Kohli (2016) showed that most transportation experts expect a significant reductions on the 
subjective value of travel time savings (SVTTS). That is, travel time will most likely be 
perceived less negatively than today. 
Overall, by looking at the direct effects of autonomous vehicles, it can be stated that most 
studies mainly see positive effects for society: other things being constant, negative 
environmental externalities will be reduced, access, egress as well as in-vehicle times will 
decrease, and opportunities for more flexible and personalized means of transport will 
emerge. Additionally, the mobilization of mobility impaired people and the independent 
car use of travelers without driver’s license is expected to provide benefits. Unfortunately, 
only estimating the benefits of the direct effects is unlikely to show the full picture of 
consequences that will emerge once autonomous vehicles enter the roads (Kuhnimhof, 
2015). As we will present in the next section, many of the discussed impacts might – 
without adequate policy interventions – not materialize when systemic effects are 
considered; an obvious example is the expected change in mode-choice behavior, with all 
its consequences, induced by the reduction in the generalized costs of private road 
transport. 
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3. SECOND-ORDER EFFECTS 
As briefly summarized in the previous section, direct effects of autonomous vehicles have 
been thoroughly considered in numerous publications. Nevertheless, these effects are 
normally addressed independently and second-order effects, i.e. developments that are due 
to shifts in the demand for transportation, are often neglected. In this sense, it is be possible 
that first-order effects appear in strengthened or weakened form or even not at all, when 
interactions between them are considered. It could be expected, for instance, that the 
aforementioned capacity improvements or the reduction of fuel consumption and emissions 
have a smaller impact than expected, when taking into consideration that autonomous 
vehicles will not only have to interact with non-autonomous vehicles (mixed traffic), but 
also with pedestrians, cyclists, vehicles parking in second row, trucks loading/unloading, 
etc. 
Along these lines, it is possible to identify several systemic (or second-order) effects, 
which go beyond the first-order impacts of autonomous vehicles, as they are the results of 
changes in travel behavior given the aforementioned first-order effect. Special emphasis 
should hereby be put on possible shifts between the demand for motorized private and 
public transport, as this may outweigh the direct effects of transportation policies and 
processes (Thomson, 1972). Figure 1 provides a systematic (however non-exhaustive) 
representation of potential consequences associated with the introduction of level 5 
autonomous vehicles. This scheme offers a rather functional representation of first- and 
second-order effects and does not aim for an analysis based on System Dynamic (Gruel 
and Stanford, 2016). Rather, we conduct an economic analysis establishing connection 
between first- and second-order effects on the basis of well-established concepts and 
cause-and-effect chains in the transportation economics literature. In this figure, solid 
arrows indicate a positive directional correlation while dashed arrows represent a negative 
directional correlation. As this section is centered on the systemic effects of automation, 
here we consider only variables expected to exhibit significant systemic effects (and for 
this reason ignoring e.g. safety or noise issues, as no significant travel behavioral changes  
and demand shifts can be expected in associated with them). For illustrative purposes, we 
in a first step assume (i) that riding an autonomous vehicle has no effect on the subjective 
value of travel time savings (SVTTS), and (ii) that the overall transport demand in terms of 
total trips for motorized alternatives remains constant with fixed destination choice 
(demand shift between alternatives is allowed though); these two assumptions will be 
relaxed at the end of this section. Further, it is assumed that the responsible authorities do 
not implement any congestion pricing in order to force users to internalize transport-related 
externalities or any restrictions associated with empty-vehicle trips (so-called zero-
occupant or ghost-trips, including empty parking trips and relocation trips; we will relax 
this assumption in Section 4). Finally, it is also assumed that taxis and public transport 
would no longer require a driver, i.e. the road-based part of these modes has transformed 
into more or less flexible SAV systems. 
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Figure 1 – Potential first-order and second-order effects related to the introduction of 
autonomous vehicles. Solid arrows indicate a positive directional correlation; dashed 
arrows represent a negative directional correlation. 
Looking at the green-shaded boxes in Figure 1, it is possible to identify the direct effects of 
autonomous vehicles discussed in Section 2, namely: 
1. the reduction in the generalized cost of taxi operation and usage (no drivers, cost-
efficient driving) and cars (cost-efficient driving, lower generalized parking costs), 
2. the reduction in operational costs of public transport systems (no driver, cost-
efficient driving), 
3. the opportunities associated with a more flexible design of public transport 
services, 
4. the increase in the flow capacity of roadways and the resulting reduction of 
congestion levels, 
5. the reduction of air pollutant emissions (efficient driving), and 
6. the increase in the number of car users. 
For the systemic analysis, it is important to consider that all the aforementioned effects 
would shift demand between the different travel alternatives: lower generalized costs for 
taxi and car trips, for example, would increase the demand for these transport modes. 
Additionally, new automobile user groups (e.g. impaired people or children) would further 
increase the demand for private car while reducing the demand for public transportation, as 
these users would no longer be PT captives. 
On the lower right corner (denoted by an oval) is the so-called vicious or virtuous circle of 
public transport (VCPT; Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011). In the positive case, better supply 
(e.g. higher flexibility of public transport) would result in greater PT demand, which, in 
turn, increases the revenue of the public transport system; a positive balance between 
revenue and costs eventually allow for improving the level of service4 etc. In the negative 
                                                          
4 Here, the actual fare paid by the users is considered to be part of the level of service, and it is assumed that a 
wider coverage, higher frequency, lower fare and shorter travel, waiting and walking times characterize a 
higher level of service, and vice versa. 
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case, lower demand levels (e.g. because of a shift towards motorized private transport) 
would result in lesser revenues and system losses and in the longer run in a poorer level of 
service, again dampening the demand for PT, etc.5 In first-order, autonomous vehicles 
would have a positive effect on the VCPT as they would reduce operational costs for the 
transport provider, while the associated higher flexibility would allow providing a better 
service. In contrast, the potential reduction in demand for transit systems could have the 
opposite effect, yielding a negative effect on the VCPT. The overall effect on the VCPT 
therefore depends on how these two effects (higher attractiveness because of cost-
efficiency and flexible supply vs less attractiveness because of lower supply/demand 
levels) balance in the long run. Furthermore, one of the main justifications for subsidizing 
public transport refers to its positive externalities as an inclusive mobility alternative; while 
these externalities are not expected to disappear, their impact may be reduced, as 
competing alternatives become more inclusive (lower price and absence of driver).6 
Overall, the above shows that changes in the modal split have the potential to cause 
significant rebound effects in the system. As we have, initially, assumed that the overall 
transport demand for motorized alternatives remains constant, any increase in the demand 
for a given transport mode would necessarily reduce the demand for the remaining 
alternatives. In this sense, if private transportation alternatives (taxi and private 
automobiles) experience a higher demand, it must result in a lower demand for public 
transport. This, in consequence, would lead to higher traffic volumes on the roads, and 
thus, to more congestion and air pollutant emissions. Here, it must be noted that the effect 
on emissions may be dual in nature: first, absolute emissions would increase as several 
trips are undertaken by less environmentally friendly modes; second, greater congestion 
levels would extend the duration of the trips and increase stop and go traffic situations, 
which is both associated with higher specific (i.e. per VKT) emissions. 
The balance between autonomous taxi (or ACS) trips and private car trips clearly depends 
(among other attributes) on the difference in generalized costs. Today, car sharing is for 
many use cases considered to be too expensive and access efforts are relatively high. 
Through ACS systems, car sharing would become cheaper and more accessible (through a 
much more efficient operation of the fleet) and new business models could emerge, 
eventually even influencing the car ownership rate in the population. However, it should be 
pointed out that even in such situation and even if the overall transport demand for private 
transportation in terms of total trips with fixed destination choice would remain constant, 
this does not mean that the total number of VKT also remains constant; in fact, an increase 
is to be expected: This increase could arise (i) because splitting of joint trips with pick-up 
and drop-off purposes is facilitated (e.g. driving directly to work in two separate cars, 
overall reducing individual travel time and the passenger load factor), and (ii) because of 
ghost-trips with the purpose of relocation (especially in the case of ACS and ARS systems, 
                                                          
5 It should be noted that higher operating costs per person not necessarily influence the level of service, as the 
responsible authority may decide to increase subsidies in order to guarantee a certain level of service to avoid 
the VCTP and a collapse of the transport system as a whole. However, maintaining a certain level of service 
for lower demand levels requires more public funding per PKT, increasing the pressure on the authorities; 
subsidizing the transit system, however, remains as a key tool of the authorities to steer transportation and 
urban systems (see Section 4). 
6 Nevertheless subsidizing public transport would still be economically justified in the absence of such 
positive externalities, as long as the regulatory authorities do not include pigouvian taxes on the externalities 
caused by private transportation. Under these circumstances subsidizing the alternative associated with the 
lesser externalities can be considered as a second-best to maximize social welfare. 
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but also in the case of private cars, when shared by various members of the household) and 
parking. The latter relates to the possible development that vehicles will not necessarily be 
parked near the travel destination, but where it makes economically sense for the user 
(Chapin et al. 2016). It is even possible, that vehicles be sent back home for parking or 
simply circulate around the block for activities with short durations. 
This possible increase in VKT through the introduction of autonomous vehicles has 
already been estimated/projected in several simulation experiments, e.g. by ITF (2015), 
Levin et al. (2016), Maciejewski and Bischoff (2016), or Fagnant and Kockelman, 2016). 
In these studies, the current demand for private car trips is entirely replaced by SAVs (ACS 
and ARS); such situation essentially postulates a state where owning a private car is either 
forbidden or the SAV systems are constantly available and by far cheaper than private car 
use, so that nobody would use their car for inner-urban trips. The authors observe an 
increase in vehicle kilometers traveled and in the mean travel time in comparison with the 
base situation. The magnitude of the increase is, however, highly dependent on the desired 
level of service i.e. the number of SAVs considered to satisfy a given demand (the more 
SAVs, the shorter the waiting times before a passenger is picked up; Levin et al., 2016; 
Maciejewski and Bischoff, 2016; Fagnant and Kockelman, 2016) . The main driving force 
behind this phenomenon is that the effects of additional relocation ghost-trips on 
congestion levels are larger than capacity gains resulting from efficient driving. In reality, 
however, the situation could be significantly worse, as these studies did neither consider 
ghost-trips with the purpose of parking nor any shifts in demand towards motorized private 
transport. For a dynamic equilibrium model, van den Berg and Verhoef (2016) find that 
even though road capacity increases with the share of AVs, switching to an autonomous 
car can yield negative externalities because of increased congestion costs resulting from 
changes in departure time behavior. By considering changes in transport demand (based on 
simple assumptions), Bösch et al. (2017b) suggest that existing transport systems might be 
a better alternative than introducing an SAV-based service. 
Considering the existing literature on capacity improvements, these results are little 
surprising. As initially postulated by Downs (1962) and Thomson (1972), capacity 
improvements for private transportation may have a negative impact on the average travel 
time in a system (Downs-Thomson paradox). It has been validated empirically in various 
studies (Cairns et al., 1998; Cairns et al., 2002; Goodwin and Nolan, 2003; Duranton and 
Turner; 2011). Even though the occurrence of the paradox has been demonstrated for 
infrastructure capacity improvements, there is no reason to expect that it cannot arise for 
capacity improvements resulting from efficient driving, as the phenomenon was 
(mathematically) derived for capacity improvements in general. The reasons behind this 
phenomenon are also well known: under normal circumstances, the introduction of new 
technologies and alternatives should lead to an increase in social welfare, as gains and 
losses are balanced by the users. This, however, does not necessarily apply in the presence 
of negative externalities. As these effects are not internalized by the users, they must be 
absorbed by the entire of society (if no regulation to internalize them is introduced) and, as 
a result, the complete system may end up in a worse-off situation. In the case of the 
Downs-Thompson paradox, capacity improvements initially favor smaller, less efficient 
vehicles (with higher externalities per passenger-kilometer), leading to a modal shift 
towards them. If the externalities associated with this modal shift exceed the original 
capacity improvements, the travel time deteriorates and the phenomenon arises.   
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A similar phenomenon related to the automation of public transport might be the 
replacement of big buses by smaller vehicles offering a more flexible and personalized 
service, which in consequence results in an increase in the capacity utilization of the 
network. This may lead to social losses in a similar fashion as the Downs-Thompson 
paradox: smaller, less efficient vehicles (in terms of externalities per passenger-kilometer) 
with higher frequency and more flexible itineraries have the potential to reduce users’ 
generalized private costs, leading therefore to demand shifts at expenses of the demand for 
more efficient larger vehicles increasing the negative externalities in the system. As in the 
Downs-Thompson paradox, if these externalities exceed the gains associated the new 
alternative, it would lead to a welfare loss. While at first sight, this phenomenon seems to 
have a potential less important effect than modal shifts from public to private 
transportation, both phenomena may add up, overall increasing congestion levels.  
In the context of Figure 1, these externalities are represented by congestion and emissions 
and denoted by the central oval7, and they play an important role when evaluating the 
impacts of AVs. Whether transportation systems will improve or deteriorate without 
further policy interventions depends on how the levels of positive first-order and systemic 
effects (which include improvements in accessibility among other wider economic 
benefits) and potentially negative systemic effects (associated with demand shifts) balance: 
In rural areas and in under-congested small cities, it is possible that the negative systemic 
effects be low in magnitude; hence, automated vehicles would be expected to lead to an 
increase in social welfare. Contrariwise, in highly congested larger cities, the negative 
externalities may exceed the benefits, leading to a loss of social welfare (Thomopoulos and 
Givoni, 2014). 
Before discussing possible management options to avoid welfare losses resulting from the 
introduction of AVs, the following two paragraphs now present the potential implications 
of relaxing the initial assumptions regarding the unchanged valuation of travel time and the 
constant demand for transport, respectively. 
Relaxing the assumption of unchanged valuation of travel time 
So far we have assumed that the SVTTS remains constant. This assumption, however, does 
not seem plausible, since, as previously mentioned, autonomous vehicles should increase 
the range of activities that can be performed during a trip, diminishing thus the SVTTS 
(Zmund et al., 2016; Willumsen and Kohli, 2016). In this context, it should not be expected 
that changes in the SVTTS affect all alternatives equally. In the case of public transport, 
little or no changes are to be expected, as individuals would still share the space with other 
passengers and they will not be affected by changes in the control of the vehicle. Major 
changes, however, can be expected in private transportation; while, in the case of 
autonomous cars, an improvement can be achieved by making possible for the user to 
dedicate their travel time to alternative meaningful activities, increasing privacy can be 
seen as the main improvement (regarding the SVTTS) of autonomous taxis in comparison 
with current taxi services. In principle, a similar SVTTS can be expected for autonomous 
cars and autonomous taxis, although the potential of private cars seems to be a little larger, 
                                                          
7 It is important to note that other externalities associated with autonomous driving, such as improvements in 
traffic safety or the inclusion of impaired persons are not being considered in this analysis, because their  
systemic effect are of low magnitude (i.e. they do not cause significant demand shifts). Considering these 
externalities would improve the benefits of autonomous vehicles.  
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as they offer the owner a wider scope for design. It must, however, be pointed out here that 
the reassessment of the SVTTS will not affect all individuals and professional groups 
equally, as different interests and occupations would be associated with widely different 
ranges of potential alternative uses for the time spent in the vehicle. 
Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the negative perception of travel time (i.e. SVTTS) would 
further diminish the generalized costs of private transportation, leading to higher demand 
for these alternatives and thus to more congestion (Smith, 2012). As a result of the latter, 
the generalized costs would increase. This implies longer driving times, which is perceived 
less negatively. Therefore, the systemic impact depends on the magnitude of the benefit 
induced by the lower valuation of time compared to the magnitude of the loss owed to 
higher travel times. This would also influence the impact on public transport: even though 
no significant changes in the SVTTS are expected here, the VCPT could be triggered and 
put public transport under pressure as demand drops because of a modal shift towards 
private transportation and the level of service of public transport deteriorates if sharing 
congested facilities with private transport. As a consequence, a new appraisal of the 
SVTTS would cause a reduction of the generalized costs of autonomous cars and 
autonomous taxis. Hence, it would add up with the first-order effects of autonomous 
vehicles described in the previous section, intensifying the systemic effects depicted in 
Figure 1. 
Relaxing the assumption of a constant demand for motorized transport 
So far, we assumed that the overall demand for motorized transportation would remain 
constant in terms of total trips, and that destination choice is also fixed. In the light of the 
previous discussion, this assumption appears unlikely to hold. Basically, demand for 
motorized transportation will go up if the private generalized costs of motorized transport 
go down and vice versa. This implies that lower generalized private cost might lead to 
induced demand through increased accessibility (Goodwin, 1996; Weis and Axhausen, 
2013; Meyer et al., 2017) in the following forms8: 
i) Increasing the attractiveness of traveling in general (trip generation) 
ii) Causing a shift from non-motorized to motorized alternatives (modal choice) 
iii) Extending trip distances (destination choice) 
It is, however, unclear whether private generalized costs would go down, as congestion is 
likely to increase the privately experienced costs. Notwithstanding, it can be expected that 
private generalized costs be lower than social costs, as (in the absence of regulatory 
policies) individuals do not internalize the external effects of their travel behavior. While it 
is possible to think of some positive externalities associated with an expanding demand for 
motorized autonomous alternatives, such as the mobilization of impaired and elderly 
people, negative externalities, such as congestion, air pollutant emissions, lesser health 
benefits (due to the shift from non-motorized to motorized alternatives) or spatial 
segregation (due to the longer trip distances) appear to be farther-reaching9. Under these 
                                                          
8 Weis and Axhausen (2009) showed, on the basis of empirical results that both trip generation and 
destination choice exhibit a inelastic positive accessibility elasticity and an elastic negative price elasticity. 
9 In the case of increased demand for motorized transport, it is not possible to establish a-priori the direction 
of safety effects, as more and longer motorized trips should increase the number of accidents, while the shift 
from non-motorized alternatives to autonomous vehicles may have a positive effect. 
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circumstances it is unlikely that a larger demand for motorized transport would lead to 
improvements in social welfare. Such a situation can only be expected in sparsely 
populated areas, where mobility effects (including wider economic benefits) might 
outweigh negative externalities.  The opposite effect, i.e. a hypothetical reduction in the 
demand for motorized transportation, would only be possible if the private generalized 
costs of motorized transportation increase. Assuming decreasing generalized costs due to 
automatization, this is only possible in a hypothetical scenario, in which congestion 
(despite lesser demand) increases above the reductions in the generalized costs. An 
increase in congestion despite lesser demand is, in turn, only possible due to the existence 
of ghost trips. Such a scenario would result in large losses in social welfare. 
Correia and v. Arem (2016) consider demand shifts and the SVTTS in a simulation 
(relying on strong assumptions in this regard). The effect is a further increase of private 
transportation. The simulation likewise suggests that this increase does not lead to major 
congestion problems, which can be tracked down to the characteristics of the street 
network, initial congestion levels and size of the urban area under consideration (Delft in 
the Netherlands). To summarize, several indicators suggest that relaxing the two initial 
assumptions on the unchanged valuation of travel time and the constant demand for 
transport will further increase the negative externalities of additional private transport 
demand. It therefore seems necessary to develop policies that can help to prepare our cities 
for the challenges related to the introduction of autonomous vehicles. This will require 
putting up a regulatory framework to allow the positive effects to unfold without the 
negative impacts to dominate. 
4. POLICY ASPECTS 
As discussed in the previous section, autonomous vehicles have the potential to facilitate 
the use of private transportation, and thus – mainly in highly congested urban areas – might 
exacerbate negative externalities. Additionally, they carry the risk of triggering a vicious 
circle which eventually yields the decline of public mass transportation. Against this 
background, this section discusses regulatory options for transportation systems in cases 
where externalities are expected to reach a relevant magnitude. This important dimension 
for policy setting has mainly been ignored in the transport economic literature (notable 
exceptions, though not providing an in-depth discussion on the topic, are Smith et al., 
2012, Zmund et al., 2016, and Bösch et al., 2017b). Other literature has instead set the 
focus on regulations regarding technical aspects, such as vehicle standards, liability and 
privacy issues and investment attraction (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015; Anderson et al., 
2016). This section therefore aims at providing an overview of additional aspects that will 
become important for sustainable transportation planning. 
In terms of policy setting, it needs to be emphasized that the effectiveness of indirect 
management alternatives that are currently in place in many cities would severely be 
reduced after the introduction of AVs. For instance, parking fees and parking restrictions, 
often discussed as a substitute to city tolls, could lose their steering effect as parking would 
no longer be associated with the travel destination, e.g. through valet-parking (i.e. the 
vehicle drops the users at the destination and undertakes the parking maneuver 
automatically; Heinrichs and Cyganski, 2015).  
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Providing high quality public transport supply is typically seen as another effective 
management strategy. However, declining costs in private transportation could reduce the 
price-gap between private and public transport, making it more and more difficult to 
compensate for typical negative features of public transport, such as transfers, scheduling, 
lack of privacy, etc. Thus, scenarios where autonomous vehicles lead to more 
intermodality (especially last-mile intermodality) are unlikely as empirical evidence shows 
that strong negative impacts arising from transfers and scheduling issues (Train, 1979; 
Frank et al., 2008; Bahamonde-Birke, 2016; among many others) are hardly compensated 
in the context of diminishing generalized cost differences. Favoring public transport by 
reducing user prices in this situation might come to mind as a policy option in order to 
counter the reducing price gap (Bösch et al., 2017b). Analytical and simulation-based 
studies, however, show that in many situations the system-optimal user price of public 
transport is already close to zero as long as the private transportation mode is not regulated 
in an efficient way by internalizing their negative externalities through tolls (see, e.g., 
Tirachini and Hensher, 2011; Kaddoura et al., 2015). Negative user prices for public 
transport cannot realistically be considered as an option as they would yield unreasonable 
levels of induced demand, much higher than those already experienced today where the 
cost of mobility is generally too low. Hence, since price reductions do not seem feasible, 
one policy option to mitigate the negative effects of autonomous vehicles on society is to 
ensure high quality public transport by increasing frequency, reducing travel time and 
generalized travel expenses (in order to compensate the reducing price gap) and thus  
avoiding the VCPT and  the collapse of the urban transport system. This might imply 
expanding financial resources for subsidizing public transport even more than today 
because these subsidies are mainly justified by the subsequent avoidance of negative 
externalities from private transportation. 
Another alternative to regulate autonomous vehicles would be to impose the restriction that 
a person in possession of a valid driver’s license must always sit on board (as currently in 
the US states of Florida and Nevada; Anderson et al., 2016). However, such a regulation 
appears to be excessively restrictive, and rules out many advantages of the technology. 
This concerns in particular the inclusion of mobility-impaired people. Relaxing this 
restriction may result in a ban of ghost-trips or its limitation to a given radius for parking 
purposes (Lenz and Fraedrich, 2015). While such restrictions would indeed enable the 
technology for impaired people, they would still prevent some key advantages of driverless 
vehicles to materialize, such as the use of autonomous taxis, car sharing (public and private 
– e.g. a vehicle is shared by different members of a household) and autonomous valet-
parking (only the ban of ghost-trips). 
In general, implementing such limitations seems to be associated with great difficulties and 
costs, and may create incentives for bypassing the law. In addition, they are not an 
effective mechanism to address the negative externalities of (private) transportation (e.g. 
limiting the search for parking slots to a given radius could result in vehicles cruising 
around in congested areas where the parking demand locally exceeds the supply) and do 
not contribute directly to easing traffic problems in hyper-congested areas. These aspects, 
in conjunction with hampering opportunities of the technology as well as the difficulties 
associated with the implementation of these restrictions, make them implausible in the long 
term. 
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Other alternatives may comprise limiting the access of motorized private transportation to 
congested areas, establishing a substantial number of PT exclusive-lanes, and enforcing 
higher car occupancy rates, especially for ARS systems. Overall, this would increase the 
generalized cost of private transportation and favoring PT as well as indirectly the non-
motorized modes. In this context it is important to note that autonomous taxis should not 
be favored over privately-owned vehicles, as they do not exhibit social benefits (in terms 
of reduction of negative externalities) to justify such advantages. Nonetheless, factually, 
prohibiting the car-use in several parts of the city may be considered as overly restrictive 
and would hamper many of the advantages associated with autonomous vehicles. 
Additionally, controlling restrictions on car occupancy rates may be associated with 
significant difficulties. Furthermore, such restrictions would not stop the replacement of 
larger busses, potentially triggering the aforementioned Downs-Thompson-like paradox 
associated with the replacement of big busses by smaller flexible vehicles. Finally, 
replacing parking fees by this kind of restrictions would also forego an important revenue 
stream. 
Therefore, road pricing, often referred to as the most efficient alternative for managing 
urban transport systems, might in the future experience much more attention in the real 
world once planners need to design the infrastructure in the presence of autonomous 
vehicles (Smith, 2012; Bösch et al., 2017b). The basic principles behind optimal (or first-
best) pricing in transport are well-known and have been studied extensively (see, e.g., 
Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993; Lindsey and Verhoef, 2001; among many others). Apart 
from the fact that toll revenues could compensate the losses associated with less parking 
fees, additional efficiency gains would be achieved through dynamic road pricing which 
addresses the externalities of transportation directly. Simulation tools for the calculation of 
first-best tolls in a real-world context accounting for all relevant externalities have recently 
been developed (see, e.g. Kickhöfer and Kern, 2015; Kaddoura et al., 2016; Agarwal and 
Kickhöfer, in press). Implementing such first-best road pricing scheme in the presence of 
autonomous vehicles seems at a first glance quite straightforward: navigation/guidance 
systems are essential for the functioning of AVs and, hence, could be used for optimal 
routing and pricing. However, it is likely that there will be a period with both, autonomous 
and conventional vehicles, on the road (mixed traffic), and such first-best pricing would be 
difficult to implement for all users. Additionally, optimal pricing would yield price signals 
that might change at a very fast pace, potentially too fast to be processed by a human 
being. In such cases, the passenger would not always be able to understand the routing of 
his or her vehicle and this might lead to confusion. Hence, in the case of mixed traffic 
conditions, the price system would still need to be understandable for humans in order to 
unfold the desired steering effect. Finally, several data privacy concerns need to be 
addressed in future research, and policies need to be developed accordingly. 
Toll systems based on either automatic number plate recognition (as in London, 
Stockholm, Gothenburg or Milan) or electronic tolling (as in Singapore, Santiago de Chile 
or Dubai) are currently in place in different countries. In this context, one can differentiate 
two charging systems: the collection of fees for accessing toll zones (e.g. London or 
Singapore) or a kilometer-based charging system (e.g. Santiago de Chile or Dubai). Both 
systems, by using toll zones and charging for road use, could have difficulties in the 
presence of autonomous vehicles. Regarding toll zones, it is questionable whether the 
system can set powerful incentives not to leave the toll zone, which could lead to more 
ghost trips (either cruising around or searching for parking slots inside the toll zone) and 
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thus to more congestion and air pollutant emissions. Alternatively, the use of multiple 
smaller toll zones could also be considered. This might help mitigating these negative 
incentives (and allow for a tolling closer to the first-best solution) but they cannot be 
completely eliminated. The problems associated with kilometer-based road pricing are 
rather of technical-financial nature, as wide toll coverage can be expensive. The sole 
tolling of the main routes carries the risk of shifting the traffic to the secondary road 
network. Regarding the control systems there are no major concerns regarding automatic 
license plate recognition or electronic toll systems. The latter would have the advantage of 
allowing for variable pricing depending on the current conditions (Goh, 2002); it implies, 
however, a higher implementation cost. To overcome the aforementioned shortcomings of 
classic road pricing, hybrid charging systems are conceivable. This way, the regulatory 
authority may offer to drivers and/or vehicle owners the alternative of allowing for an 
accurate vehicle tracking in exchange for lower fares. This approach would allow for an 
accurate pricing system in accordance with the externalities actually caused by the vehicle. 
Such strategies are also conceivable in order to allow access to high-occupancy vehicle 
lanes, offering incentives to encourage carpooling, etc. 
Regarding the facilitation of shared autonomous vehicle systems by the responsible 
authority, it needs to be taken into account that ACS systems are more prone to increase 
traffic volumes than ARS systems. In the latter system, passengers share a car with other 
parties by bundling trips. For example, Trommer et al. (2016) estimate for urban areas in 
Germany an increase in traffic volumes (VKT) induced by an ACS system to +5%, and a 
decrease in traffic volume induced by an ARS system to -2%. In consequence, priority 
should be given to mobility providers that base their business model on shared trips rather 
than only shared vehicles. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
While a large body of literature has highlighted various potential benefits of autonomous 
vehicles, possible systemic effects, mainly resulting from to-be-expected shifts in demand, 
have so far mostly been overlooked. Transportation systems are typically characterized by 
complex interactions between millions of individuals, full of externalities, where first-order 
oriented policies do not always achieve their goals as negative systemic effects may 
outweigh the direct benefits of the technologies and policies. That is a lessons learned from 
the time where policy making concentrated almost entirely on providing infrastructure for 
individual motorized transport. 
In this paper, we therefore analyzed potential systemic effects of driverless vehicles and 
establish correlations among them on the basis of previous well-established results in the 
transportation economics literature, in order to provide a systemic overview of the possible 
consequences of these vehicles entering the roads. We showed that autonomous vehicles 
may cause significant shifts in the demand for transportation both at the level of trip 
generation as well as at the level of mode and destination choice, by increasing the 
attractiveness of travelling and of the motorized alternatives. Under these circumstances, 
the introduction of autonomous vehicles poses significant risks for the development of 
transportation systems, especially in relation to a potential advance of the private 
motorized transport at expenses of non-motorized and public transportation. Such 
development would be accompanied by an increase of several externalities that many cities 
are fighting already today, such as congestion or air pollution. This increase in negative 
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externalities is even likely to happen if new business models for on-demand ACS systems 
reduce car ownership levels in the population as on-road transport volumes are still 
expected to increase. Hence, the technology has the potential of triggering the vicious 
circle of public transportation and, without intervention such as city tolls and favoring ARS 
over ACS systems as supplement to conventional PT, eventually leading to a collapse of 
the transport system as a whole. 
Therefore, it is important that responsible authorities carefully consider the possible 
systemic impacts of autonomous vehicles since especially current regulatory policies are 
likely to lose their efficiency (as in the case of parking regulations). In this context, the 
paper raises awareness that it will be necessary to develop new strategies for steering the 
transportation systems and guarantee a sustainable transportation planning. Along these 
lines, we considered several regulatory policies that have been proposed in the past, in the 
light of their pros and cons. We conclude that implementing tolling systems appear to be 
the most promising alternative to address the issues arising from the introduction of 
driverless vehicles. Notwithstanding, tolling systems that are currently in place would have 
to be adapted in the presence of autonomous vehicles, as they may cause undesirable 
effects. We therefore strongly suggest that further research be conducted on how to balance 
the perceived costs of mobility between private and public transportation that will 
inherently change with the emergence of autonomous vehicles. Certainly, this requires the 
development of prediction and evaluation metrics that are able to capture changes in 
mobility behavior as a result of changes in the existence or in the attributes of travel 
alternatives resulting from autonomous vehicles. 
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